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In the midst of rising interest in cross-cultural comparative philosophy, the 
methodology of comparisons between Western philosophy and Chinese philosophy 
have been the focus of scholarship. In Ames’ view, as the common philosophical 
theorization between the two different cultural traditions could hardly be achieved, 
we could hardly conclude a joined philosophical problem between the two different 
philosophical traditions. In this case, it is more practical to test whether a solution 
from one tradition is helpful for solving the problem in another tradition instead of 
philosophically theorization about the two traditions. In contrast to Ames’ pragmatic 
approach, Mou Bo argues for the constructive-engagement strategy in comparative 
philosophy. Mou’s strategy is to find a common philosophical problem which is 
jointly concerned by different philosophical traditions. Faced with the common 
philosophical problems, the different philosophical traditions could have their own 
answers. In this case, we should integrate and adjust the different answers to find a 
relatively definite answer for the common philosophical problem. In the case of 
comparing Xun Zi’s Dao and Aristotle’s eudemonia, this article argues that we may 
employ both the pragmatic approach and constructive-engagement strategy. Although 
there are quite a lot of historical and philosophical differences between Xun Zi and 
Aristotle’s philosophy, it is in the jointly concerned problem that Xun Zi’s philosophy 
could provide a solution for the disputation of inclusivism and intellectualism in 
understanding Aristotle. 
 
1. AMES’ PRAGMATIC APPROACH 
 
In Thinking through Confucius, Roger T. Ames puts forward the methodology of 
comparative philosophy. He argues that, 
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……in the enterprise of comparative philosophy, difference is more interesting than 
similarity……we hold that it is precisely this recognition of significant differences that 
provides an opportunity for mutual enrichment by suggesting alternative responses to 
problems that resist satisfactory resolution within a single culture. The comparative 
method employed in this essay has led us to isolate a particular problem within our 
cultural milieu and then to employ the thought of Confucius as a means of clarifying 
precisely what is at issue with regard to that problem and to suggest approaches to its 
reconsideration…….It is transcultural in intent since it seeks to promote that sort of 
dialogue which eventually may result in a mutual recognition of both commonalities and 
differences a means of addressing important issues of theoretical and practical concern. 
(Hall and Ames 1987, 5-6) 
 
For Ames, we should “isolate” a particular problem in one cultural tradition and find 
the solution to this problem in another cultural tradition. We could see Ames’ 
methodology is emphasizing the importance of finding the solution in one 
philosophical tradition to a particular problem in another philosophical tradition, 
though the differences and distinctions between the two philosophical traditions are 
adequately acknowledged. In this case, the different philosophical traditions could 
enrich and benefit each other by learning from each other. We could see, in Ames’ 
interpretation, the goal of comparing different philosophical traditions is to find a 
practical solution to a particular philosophical problem in one tradition, while the 
differences and similarities in the metaphysical background and the whole 
philosophical system are laid aside.        
In fact, in the comparison, a person will have to employ the language and 
conception in one’s own native cultural tradition to understand and interpret the 
ideas in another tradition.  
 
The naive assumptions that one can find a neutral place from which to compare different 
cultural sensibilities or that one can easily take an objective interpretive stance within an 
alternative culture, while comforting to those compulsively attached to the external 
trappings of objective scholarship, have led to the most facile and distorted accounts of 
exoteric thinkers. (Hall and Ames 1987, 12) 
 
Since we have no neutral place from which to compare the different cultural 
traditions, we must be very careful in the comparison between Chinese and Western 
philosophies. For this purpose, we must be patient and imaginative in making the 
valid comparison. 
  In another book, Anticipating China: Thinking Through the Narratives, Hall and 
Ames argue that “many of the concepts and doctrines that came to comprise the 
dominant intellectual inventory of Western culture” constitute “those assumptions 
which hinder members of Western culture from understanding China on its own 
terms”. (Hall and Ames 1995, xx). Hall and Ames advocate “pragmatism and 
historicism” that “in the area of comparative studies, philosophical theorizing should 
be replaced by more concrete, praxix-oriented endeavors”. (Hall and Ames 1995, 
xxi.). In Ames’ view, as the philosophical theorization between the two different 
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cultural traditions could hardly be achieved, we could hardly conclude a joined 
philosophical problem both of the traditions concern about. In this case, it is more 
practical to test or experimentally think (Tan 2016, 158-174) whether a solution from 
one tradition is helpful for solving the problem in another tradition instead of 
philosophical theorizing about the two traditions.     
   In contrast to this pragmatic approach, Mou Bo, however, argues that, 
 
It is noted that the Hall/Ames style pragmatic approach as a whole can be refined into its 
pragmatic “perspective” dimension and its foregoing pragmatist “guiding-principle 
dimension; its pragmatic perspective per se can be “eligible” whenever there are such 
“pragmatic” aspects of objects of study which certain “pragmatic” perspectives are in 
need to point to and capture; however, an indiscriminate “pragmatist” guiding principle 
identified above can be “inadequate” because it does not do justice to other “eligible” 
perspectives but celebrates the pragmatic perspective only. In this sense, and to this 
extent, the constructive-engagement strategy can do justice to the “pragmatic” 
methodological perspective while explaining why and in which connections an 
indiscriminate “pragmatist” methodological guiding principle needs to be regulated. 
(Mou 2018, 25)  
In the next section, we will examine Mou’s constructive-engagement strategy in 
details. 
2. MOU’S CONSTRUCTIVE-ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 
In the journal of Comparative Philosophy, Mou argues that  
  
 One strategic goal and basic methodological strategy of comparative philosophy as 
understood in a philosophically interesting and significant way can be summarized in this 
manner: to inquire into how, via reflective criticism (including self-criticism) and 
argumentation, distinct modes of thinking, methodological approaches, visions, insights, 
substantial points of view, or conceptual and explanatory resources from different 
philosophical traditions and/or different styles/orientations of doing philosophy (within 
one tradition or from different traditions) can learn from each other and jointly contribute 
to our understanding and treatment of a series of issues, themes or topics of philosophical 
significance, which can be jointly concerned through appropriate philosophical 
interpretation and/or from a broader philosophical vantage point. (Mou 2010, 3) 
 
That is to say, comparative philosophy focuses on the comparison between different 
philosophical traditions, in which we could solve some philosophical problem or 
invent some philosophical ideas. But how could the comparison be valid, considering 
the various different cultural and philosophical traditions?  
Mou argues that, 
 
Although historical descriptions provide necessary sources and data bases for further 
philosophical interpretation and elaboration, comparative philosophy (as philosophical 
inquiry) can neither stop at merely giving historical descriptions and being content with 
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seeking apparent similarities and differences of thinkers’ views or texts under 
comparative examination without further philosophical interpretation and philosophical-
issue-engagement, nor even take the historical-description-giving approach as the 
exclusively legitimate approach in comparative studies. (Mou 2010, 5) 
 
In this case, we should focus on the philosophical interpretation and engagement in 
comparative philosophy. In the cross-traditional interpretation, “some effective 
conceptual and explanatory resources well developed in another tradition or account 
can be consciously used to enhance our understanding of, and to elaborate, the 
thinker’s ideas/texts.” (Mou 2010, 14) 
Mou then puts forwards three phases in the comparison: 
 
1. The pre-engagement phase, in which certain ideas from distinct accounts or from 
different traditions that are relevant to the common concern under examination and thus 
to the purpose of the project are focused on and identified; 
2. The engagement phase, in which those ideas internally engage with each other in view 
of that common concern and the purpose to be served; and 
3. The post-engagement phase, in which those distinct ideas from different sources are 
now absorbed or assimilated into a new approach to the common concern under 
examination. (Mou 2010, 17) 
 
As for the first phase, we should derive some philosophical ideas from the 
philosophical tradition with a philosophical perspective, while “without involving 
those irrelevant elements in the account or tradition from which such a perspective 
comes”. The reason is that what we are going to do in comparative philosophy is not 
studying on the relationship between the idea and its cultural tradition or background, 
but how the idea is related to the concerned philosophical problem. In the second 
phase, the philosophical ideas from different cultural traditions are constructively 
engaged. “From each party’s point of view, the other party is something external 
without; but, from a broader philosophical vantage point and in view of the jointly 
concerned issue, the distinct views may be complementary within.” In the last phase, 
what we should do is to “adjust, blur and absorb different perspectives into one 
approach as a whole.” (Mou 2010, 18) 
    As we can see, Ames’ approach in comparative philosophy is to find an approach 
for solving the problem of one philosophical tradition by employing the resources 
from another philosophical tradition, while setting aside the metaphysical or other 
philosophical differences between these two philosophical traditions. We can see 
Ames’ approach is rather pragmatic in that it is not going to explore the fundamental 
metaphysics or ethical similarities or differences between different cultural traditions 
but just for finding a practical approach for “treating” the “illness” or problem by 
employing the external “medicine”, whether the background and cultural tradition of 
such “medicine” is how different from us. As long as it is effective, it could be used 
to solve the problem and improve the understanding of the philosophy in different 
traditions.   
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Mou’s constructive-engagement strategy is different from Ames’ approach. 
Mou’s strategy is for finding a common philosophical problem which is jointly 
concerned by different philosophical traditions. While acknowledging the different 
traditions and cultural background, it focuses on the philosophical problem derived 
from the different traditions. Faced with the common philosophical problems, the 
different philosophical traditions could have their own answer. In this case, we should 
integrate and adjust the different answers to find a relatively definite answer for the 
common philosophical problem. We can see such strategy is based on the assumption 
that the different philosophical traditions could have a common metaphysical or 
ethical foundation, or at least, a common concern in philosophy (such as human 
nature, justice, etc.), from which we could conclude the common problem in the 
different traditions. 
So, which strategy is more adaptable to the comparative philosophy? Before we 
can answer this question, let’s turn to a comparative examination between Xun Zi’s 
and Aristotle’s relevant approaches, from which we might be on a better position to 
make a valid evaluation. 
 
3.  TOWARD A METHODOLOGY COMBINING AMES’ AND MOU’S 
APPROACHES—A CASE STUDY OF XUN ZI’S DAO AND ARISTOTLE’S 
EUDAIMONIA 
 
As for the Dao, Xun Zi said, 
 
The sage knows the flaws of the mind’s operation and perceives the misfortunes of 
blindness and being closed to the truth. This is why he is without desires and aversions, 
without beginnings and ends of things, without the remote or near, without broadness or 
shallowness, without antiquity or modernity. He lays out all the myriad things and causes 
himself to exactly match how each settles on the suspended balance…..What is the 
balance? I say that it is the Dao. This is why it is inadmissible for the mind not to know 
the Dao……Therefore the critical factor necessary to put things in order consists in 
understanding the Dao. (Knoblock 1994, 21.5a-b.) 
 
Thus, Xun Zi’s Dao is a Dao contextualized in “all the myriad things”, which dispels 
personal obsessions. Xun Zi argued that the teachings of various schools all stick to 
one point while neglect other schools’ reasonable points. Xun Zi said, 
     
Mo Di was blinded by utility and was insensible to the value of good form. Song Xing 
was blinded by desire and was insensible to satisfaction. Shen Dao was blinded by law 
and was insensible to worth. Shen Buhai was blinded by technique and was insensible to 
knowledge. Hui Shi was blinded by propositions and was insensible to realities. Zhuang 
Zhou was blinded by Nature and was insensible to men. Thus in a doctrine called the Dao 
grounded on “utility”, everyone will be consumed with seeking profit. In a doctrine 
called the Dao grounded in “desire”, everyone will concentrate on seeking satisfaction. In 
one that grounds everything in “law”, every decision becomes wholly a matter of 
calculation……Each of these methods encompasses but a single corner of the Dao. But 
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the Dao itself is constant in its form yet completely changeable. One corner is an 
insufficient basis for drawing conclusions about it. (Knoblock 1994, 21.4) 
 
We should notice that, in criticizing the teachings of non-Confucian schools, Xun Zi 
did not totally reject them but accept the reasonable points in their teachings. For Xun 
Zi, the reasonable elements in various schools could also be a part of the Dao. 
However, these non-Confucian teachings could not cover all of Dao. Dao itself 
includes not only ren (仁 benevolence), yi (義 propriety), li (禮 ritual) and other 
Confucian teachings, but also fa (法 law), ci (辭 language and logic), tian (天 nature) 
and other non-Confucian teachings. Despite the non-Confucian teachings, the 
Confucian teachings like benevolence and rituals are still the core of Confucian Dao. 
Xun Zi said, 
     
Only after the gentleman has dwelt with humane principles through justice and morality 
is he truly humane; only after he conducts himself with justice and morality through ritual 
principles is he truly just and moral; and only where he regulates with ritual principles, 
returning to the root and perfecting the branch, is he truly in accord with ritual principles. 
Only when there three have been made comprehensive has he reached the Dao. 
(Knoblock 1994, 27.21) 
 
For Xun Zi, Dao is always Confucian Dao, through which ren, yi and li are linked 
together. Janghee Lee argues,  
 
Xunzi’s fundamental concern seems to lie not in the complete transformation of ordinary 
xin into achieved xin, but in the articulation of the capacities of xin to allow people to 
attain the knowledge of dao…li is closely related to the notion of dao…Li furnishes dao 
with specific and “formal prescriptions for proper behavior.” Accordingly, li can be 
deemed one of the core elements that embody the spirit of dao. (Lee 2005, 54-56) 
 
In Lee’s view, li is the core element of Dao, which might include many aspects and 
dimensions. A. S. Cua also argues,  
 
I have construed tao [dao] as a generic term that has its fundamental specifications in 
jen [ren] (benevolence), li (ritual rules), and i [yi] (rightness). Contrary to this 
interpretation, it is commonly held that li is Hsun Tzu [Xun Zi]’s basic concept. It 
cannot be denied that li occupies a central place in Hsun Tzu’s philosophy. But if we 
follow this interpretation, we need to regard li as an inclusive virtue that embraces both 
jen and i, and other virture. (Cua 1985, 160-161) 
 
Thus, in Cua’s view, it is Dao rather than li that dominates Xun Zi’s philosophies and 
Confucian teachings. I wish to push his point further: Xun Zi’s Dao is a much broader 
concept that may include not only the Confucian doctrines such as li, ren, yi, etc., but 
also some useful doctrines from other schools, including fa, which could be utilized 
to develop Confucianism to be more comprehensive. 
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Happiness is the English translation of Greek word eudaimonia. In its origin, 
eudaimonia has the implication of “loving for the God” and is related with human 
flourishing or good luck. From Socrates, eudaimonia bears the characteristic of 
“doing well” or “living well”. For the ancient Greeks, eudaimonia is the ultimate goal 
for the human life. Aristotle’s eudaimonia also followed such ancient Greek tradition 
and explicated its meanings in a more explicit way. 
To understand Aristotle’s eudaimonia, we will have to examine the core element 
in this concept, that is, the good. Aristotle said, 
 
Even if there is some good which is universally predicable of goods or is capable of 
separate and independent existence, clearly it could not be achieved or attained by man; 
but we are now seeking something attainable……For all of these sciences, though they 
aim at some good and seek to supply the deficiency of it, leave on one side the 
knowledge of the good. (1097a5-7) 
 
Then, does it mean that the ultimate goal of human life could be attained when they 
attained the level of virtue? For this question, Aristotle would say no. For him, virtue 
is not the ultimate goal of human life. Instead, it is eudaimonia rather than other 
virtues is the ultimate goal people should pursue. Eudaimonia is not equivalent to 
virtue, which is only a state of character (1106a11-12). Although the argument of 
virtue occupies a central place in Aristotle’s ethics, the purpose of virtue and 
Aristotle’s ethics is for attaining eudaimonia. In the process of realizing the 
eudaimonia, virtue is only the first step. Aristotle said, 
 
With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our account is in 
harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small 
difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in 
activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man 
who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who 
has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. (1098b30-1099a3) 
 
We could see, Aristotle’s happiness is not the possession of the virtue, which is only a 
state of character, but the use of virtue in practice, that is, the virtuous activity. 
Aristotle said, 
     
Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for 
we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since 
otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use), we must examine the nature of 
actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these determine also the nature of the 
states of character that are produced, as we have said. (1103b27-31) 
        
   We have known that a person should put his virtue into practice so as to achieve the 
happiness. However, asides from such virtuous practice, we also need other 
conditions to attain the level of happiness. In Aristotle’s words, such conditions are 
“external goods”. Aristotle said, 
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It needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts 
without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political 
power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of which takes the luster from 
happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very ugly in 
appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy……As we 
said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition; for which reason 
some identify happiness with good fortune, though others identify it with excellence. 
(1099a31-1099b7) 
 
Thus, the external goods such as good birth, good children and beauty are the 
necessary conditions for attaining happiness. However, the external goods are not 
determined by someone’s willingness, instead, it is determined by the luck (1099b1-
5). A person lives virtuously with the accompany of external goods could be regarded 
as happiness.  
All of the above definitions and descriptions of happiness are what Aristotle 
argued in the first nine chapters of Nicomachean Ethics. To conclude all of these 
definitions, we could see that happiness is an integrated body which includes both 
virtuous activities and external goods. However, in Chapter 10 of Nicomachean 
Ethics, which is also the last chapter, Aristotle mentioned the features of happiness 
again. He concluded that, 
 
We said, then, that it (happiness) is not a state; for if it were it might belong to some one 
who was asleep through his life, living the life of a plant, or, again, to some one who was 
suffering the greatest misfortunes. If these implications are unacceptable, and we must 
rather class happiness as an activity, as we have said before, and if some activities are 
necessary, and desirable for the sake of something else, while others are so in themselves, 
evidently happiness must be placed among those desirable in themselves, not among 
those desirable for the sake of something else; for happiness does not lack anything, but 
is self-sufficient. Now those activities are desirable in themselves from which nothing is 
sought beyond the activity. And of this nature virtuous actions are thought to be; for to do 
noble and good deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake. (1176a33-b9) 
 
Thus, we will find that the statement “happiness does not lack anything, but is self-
sufficient” seems contrary to the former argument of happiness. In the former nine 
chapters, happiness, which consists of virtuous activities and external goods, is not so 
sufficient as what is defined in chapter 10. In fact, Aristotle regarded virtue itself as 
limited and insufficient. Aristotle said, 
     
The self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong most to the contemplative (θεωρια) 
activity……And this activity alone would seem to be loved for its own sake; for nothing 
arises from it apart from the contemplating, while from practical activities we gain more or 
less apart from the action. (1177a28-1177b4) 
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In this sense, virtuous activities, from which we gain more or less, are not sufficient. 
However, contemplative activities are not dependent upon anything and so it is totally 
sufficient by itself. 
There are quite a lot of debates over eudaimonia in the scholarship. The debate 
normally focuses on the understanding of eudaimonia as virtuous activities and 
external goods or the contemplative activities. Some scholars argue that the happiness 
includes both virtuous activities and external goods, which could be labeled as 
“inclusivism”. (Cooper 1999) Some scholars argue that happiness refers only the 
contemplative activities, which could be labeled as “intellectualism”. (Reeve 1992) 
Other scholars argue that Aristotle swings between “inclusivism” and 
“intellectualism”. (Broadie 1991) 
Thus, how to understand eudaimonia? It refers to the virtuous activities or just 
intellectual (contemplative) activities? To answer this question, we will have to 
examine the concept of contemplation (θεωρια) at first. 
In Metaphysics, Aristotle argued, 
 
Therefore it (nous) must be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most 
excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking. (1074b33-5) 
 
This means that nous is same as what it thinks, which is itself. Aristotle said further,  
     
We answer that in some cases the knowledge is the object. In the productive sciences, it 
is the substance or essence of the object, matter omitted, and in the theoretical sciences 
the definition or the act of thinking is the object. Since, then, thought and the object of 
thought are not different in the case of things that have not matter, the divine thought and 
its object will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with the object of its thought. 
(1074b38-1075a5) 
 
This is to say, the thinking should be the thinking of what the most excellent in 
oneself. For the God, thinking is thinking of himself; while for the human beings, 
thinking is thinking of what is best in himself, that is, the rationality. Here, 
contemplation (θεωρια) is the speculation of things that have not material substance 
(including philosophy, God or nous). 
For Aristotle, such contemplation could help a person to attain the ultimate 
happiness. In chapter 7 of Nicomachean Ethics X, Aristotle stated some 
characteristics of contemplation: 
 
First, contemplation is the best and, secondly it is the most continuous, since we can 
contemplate truth more continuously than we do anything. And we think happiness has 
pleasure mingled with it, but the activity of philosophic wisdom is admittedly the 
pleasantest of virtuous activities……And the self-sufficiency that is spoken of must 
belong most to the contemplative activity. (1177a20-29)  
Here, we could compare the features of contemplation with those of happiness to see 
whether contemplation could satisfy all the conditions of happiness. 
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First, contemplation is an activity, rather than a disposition. Contemplation is an 
intellectual activity. Second, contemplation is a sufficient activity. Third, 
contemplation is chosen by itself rather than by other purpose. Fourth, contemplation 
is an activity in accordance with the proper excellence. Aristotle said, 
 
If happiness is activity in accordance with excellence, it is reasonable that it should be in 
accordance with the highest excellence; and this will be that of the best thing in 
us……the activity of this in accordance with its proper excellence will be complete 
happiness. That this activity is contemplative we have already said. (1177a7-18) 
 
From the above four descriptions, we will find that the contemplation satisfies all the 
conditions of happiness. In this sense, we could say that contemplation is the core of 
the happiness. 
Although the contemplation is the core of happiness, we might not say that 
virtuous activities that Aristotle related to happiness are not happiness. In fact, despite 
the insufficiency, the virtuous activities could be regarded as the “secondary 
happiness” while the contemplation is the “primary happiness”. So, how could the 
pure theoretical contemplation be compatible with the virtuous activities? Before we 
answer this question, let us see what Xun Zi said about the similar question. 
In Xun Zi’s view, Confucian Dao is an integrated body that consists of various 
virtuous activities and external goods. However, we might easily neglect an important 
concept here, that is, “da-qing-ming” (大清明 Great Pure Understanding). So, what 
is da-qing-ming? How is it related to the virtuous activities? Xun Zi said, 
 
A person who knows the Dao and discerns it and puts it into practice embodies the Dao. 
Emptiness, unity, and stillness are called the Great Pure Understanding (da-qing-ming). 
Each of the myriad things has a form that is perceptible. Each being perceived can be 
assigned its proper place. Each having been assigned its proper place will not lose its 
proper position. Although a person sits in his own house, yet he can perceive all within 
the four seas. Although he lives in the present, he can put in its proper place what is 
remote in space and distant in time……Extensive and complete, broad and wide—who 
knows his limits? Bright and luminous, brilliant and shining—who knows his inner 
power? Rolling and bubbling, multitudinous and multifarious—who can know his 
external form? Brightness comparable to the sun and moon; greatness filling the Eight 
Poles—such a person is truly what is meant by “Great Man.” How indeed could he have 
obsessions!(Knoblock 1994, 21.5d~21.5e) 
 
From the above quoted, we could see, the Great Pure Understanding is the status 
when we attain the Emptiness, unity and stillness. So, what is “emptiness, unity and 
stillness”? Xun Zi said, 
 
What do men [humans] use to know the Way [Dao]? I say that it is in the xin. How does 
the xin know? I say by its emptiness, unity, and stillness. The xin never stops storing; 
nonetheless it possesses what is called emptiness. The xin never lacks duality; 
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nonetheless it possesses what is called unity. The xin never stops moving; nonetheless it 
possesses what is called stillness. (Knoblock 1994, 21.5d) 
 
Xun Zi argued that we should accommodate the myriad things and various views to 
avoid prejudices, but how could a person accomplish this? Xun Zi said, 
 
Men [humans] (Ren 人) from birth have awareness. Having awareness, there is memory. 
Memories are stored in the mind, yet the mind has the property called emptiness. Not 
allowing what has previously been stored to interfere with what is being received in the 
mind is called emptiness. (Knoblock 1994, 21.5d)1 
 
Although we have stored in our xin (心 ) memories of the knowledge we have 
perceived, xin should not be totally preoccupied with such previous knowledge to the 
point of neglecting the importance of future learning. Even if what we are going to 
learn is different from or contradicts what we have learnt, we should be able to 
entertain it without prejudice and understand it on its own terms. That is to say, 
regardless of how much knowledge we have stored in our xin, we should reserve 
enough room for accommodating new knowledge. Only in this way could the 
previous knowledge serve as the basis of our future learning. Also, only in this way 
would future learning add to our knowledge persistently. Thus, Xun Zi employed the 
method of xu (虛) to attain the detached mind to accommodate various views in the 
xin.  
We should notice that Xun Zi’s “emptiness” is not total emptiness. In other words, 
the previous knowledge should still be stored in the xin so that the further acquired 
knowledge could be gained in addition to previous knowledge. Xun Zi said, “The xin 
never stops storing…” (Knoblock 1994, 21.5d) For Xun Zi, the usage of xu is for 
cultivating xin into an ideal state so as to know the Way. 
 
What do men use to know the Way? I say that it is the mind. How does the mind know? I 
say by its xu (emptiness), unity, and stillness. (Knoblock 1994, 21.5d) 
 
So, for Xun Zi, the usage of xu is for dispelling prejudices in the xin and knowing the 
Confucian way comprehensively. This is a moral epistemological purpose within the 
context of personal cultivation and good government.  
For Xun Zi, to establish the Confucian way and adapt what is learnt to the current 
circumstance, a person must open his mind and broaden it to avoid prejudices and 
accommodate more views. But how could such diverse views adopted from various 
schools be kept coherent and formulated into a set of systematic knowledge? This 
requires yi (壹 unity). 
 
                                                
1 As some commentators (Tao Hongqing 陶鴻慶 and Wang Tianhai 王天海) observe, ren (humans) 
here should be xin (heart/mind), considering the meaning of following paragraphs. See Wang 2005, 
849-850. 
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The xin from birth has awareness. Having awareness, there is perception of difference. 
Perception of difference consists in awareness of two aspects of things at the same time. 
Awareness of two aspects of things all at the same time entails duality; nonetheless the 
xin has the quality called yi. Not allowing the one thing to interfere with the other is 
called yi. (Knoblock 1994, 21.5d) 
 
Yi in the Xun-Zi refers to xin’s function of maintaining coherence in knowing. This 
means: although we may have perceptions of different aspects among various things 
or in a thing simultaneously, xin could concentrate on one aspect while at the same 
time keeping all the other aspects coherent. The xin would not let the perception of 
other aspects interrupt the perception of the current aspect, while these different 
perceptions could be kept coherent by xin’s function of yi.  
For Xun Zi, since humans should govern and utilize the myriad things in the 
world to serve themselves, they should first try to know the myriad things. People 
could have different views of the world and this is the reason why the different 
schools exist in the world. But since the myriad things are unified, the knowledge of 
them should also be unified instead of being separated. In this sense, the different 
schools’ views, which could be regarded as different aspects of the whole truth, 
should be combined and unified into a whole so as to realize the final truth. That is to 
say, the various views of different schools should be unified to formulate a holistic 
view of the world. Xun Zi said, 
 
The myriad things constitute one aspect of the Way, and a single thing constitutes      one 
aspect of the myriad things. The stupid who act on the basis of one aspect of one thing, 
considering that therein they know the Way, are ignorant. (Knoblock 1994, 17.12) 
 
For Xun Zi, since all views should be unified, we should not only focus on one 
particular view but should keep the different views of all things unified and coherent. 
Only in this way, we might be able to know the world comprehensively. For Xun Zi, 
emptying xin and accepting the different views is only the first step for knowing the 
truth. The next step is to unify these different perceptions and fit them together so as 
to achieve a full and good understanding.  
After xu and yi, it seems that a person could have formulated the most 
comprehensive knowledge of the world. However, for Xun Zi, there is another 
necessary condition for achieving this goal which is jing (靜 stillness) in the xin. 
Without jing, xu and yi could not be completed smoothly. Xun Zi said, 
 
When the mind is asleep, it dreams. When it relaxes, it moves of its own accord. When it 
is employed in a task, it plans. Thus the mind never stops moving; nonetheless it 
possesses the quality called stillness. Not allowing dreams and fantasies to bring disorder 
to awareness is called stillness. (Knoblock 1994, 21.5d.) 
 
“Jing” in the Xun Zi means that we should overcome all kinds of illusions or dreams 
in the xin so as to realize the Way. Since we all have illusions or imaginations in our 
everyday life, such as dreams, nonsense thoughts, illusions, etc., we should not let 
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such illusions distract our thinking. For Xun Zi, xin should be kept still just like the 
still water to reflect the Way without distortion. Xun Zi said, 
 
The human mind may be compared to a pan of water. If you place the pan upright and do 
not stir water up, the mud will sink to the bottom, and the water on top will be clear and 
pure enough to see your beard and eyebrows and to examine the lines on your face. But if 
a slight wind passes over its surface, the submerged mud will be stirred up from the 
bottom, and the clarity and purity of the water at the top will be disturbed so that it is 
impossible to obtain the correct impression of even the general outline of the face. Now, 
the mind is just the same. (Knoblock 1994, 21.7b) 
 
Thus, after attaining the status of “xu, yi and jing” (虚壹而静), that is, the status 
of “da-qing-ming”, a person could have a most comprehensive mind to accommodate 
the various views of the world so as to attain the Dao. Here, we could see that Xun 
Zi’s “da-qing-ming” is beyond virtuous activities. “Extensive and complete, broad 
and wide—who knows his limits? Bright and luminous, brilliant and shining—who 
knows his inner power? Rolling and bubbling, multitudinous and multifarious—who 
can know his external form?” seems to say that, virtuous activities have some limits 
and concrete forms, while “da-qing-ming” is beyond the external limits and is 
sufficient by itself. Although it has no concrete forms, it embodies various virtuous 
activities and even the fundamental principles of the cosmos. Once a person attains 
the status of “da-qing-ming”, he realizes the Dao. In this aspect, we could see that 
Xun Zi’s way of attaining “da-qing-ming”—“xu, yi and jing” —is quite close to 
Aristotle’s “θεωρια” (contemplation). 
Xun Zi’s “xu, yi and jing” and Aristotle’s “θεωρια” (contemplation) have many 
similarities, in which Aristotle’s “θεωρια” is for achieving the highest happiness, 
while Xun Zi’s “xu, yi and jing” is for attaining the highest dao. Happiness and Dao 
are the ultimate purpose and status for the two philosophers. In this case, could we 
say that happiness and dao only lies in “θεωρια” and “xu, yi and jing”? It seems too 
rash to do so. For Aristotle, if happiness only lies in “θεωρια”, he seems not 
necessary to talk about happiness in terms of virtuous activities and external goods in 
the former nine chapters of Nicomachean Ethics. For Xun Zi, if dao lies only in “xu, 
yi and jing”, then he seems not necessary to talk about virtuous practices and ritual 
principles in the rest chapters of Xun-Zi. It seems to indicate that, “θεωρια” and “xu, 
yi and jing” are not the full of happiness or Dao, although they are the cores of them. 
In Xun Zi’s view, although a person could attain the Dao when he achieves the 
status of “da-qing-ming”, this highest status does not dispel the Dao at the lower 
level. Virtuous activities and ritual principles are the expressions of “da-qing-ming” 
in the realistic world, which belongs to a lower-level Dao. All of these are the 
elements of the Dao. That is to say, it is right to say that Confucian Dao is the 
combination of virtuous activities and external goods. However, we must notice that a 
higher-level Confucian Dao is the reflection of the virtuous activities or even the 
cosmos orders. Aristotle’s “θεωρια” is quite similar to Xun Zi’s “xu, yi and jing”. 
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“θεωρια” is also the theoretical reflection of the human rationality and cosmos nous, 
which is not limited to some specific virtuous activity.  
In this aspect, Xun Zi’s view could provide a solution for the disputation between 
inclusivism and intellectualism among Aristotle’s research. That is to say, when we 
make clear the position of “xu, yi and jing” and “θεωρια” in Xun Zi and Aristotle’s 
philosophies and their relationship with virtuous activities and external goods, we 
could stand on a better position to explain such a problem, that is, why Aristotle 
argued that virtuous activities and external goods are happiness in the former nine 
chapters of Nicomachean Ethics, while arguing that contemplation is the highest 
happiness at the end of the book? Or we may ask, if Nicomachean Ethics is a 
consistent book, how the highest happiness be compatible with virtuous activities and 
external goods that are concluded as the low-level happiness?  
We know that, Xun Zi argued that the realization of Dao lies in the attainment of 
“da-qing-ming”, which is realized by the activities of “xu, yi and jing”. After the 
activities of “xu, yi and jing”, we could accommodate more views of cosmos and 
human life. Various virtuous activities and moral practices is the foundation of “xu, yi 
and jing”, which does not dispel the virtuous activities. In this case, “da-qing-ming” 
and moral practices are compatible as the former is the self-reflection of the latter and 
the latter is the expression of the former in practice. 
The status of “da-qing-ming” includes the reflection of virtuous activities and 
external goods, so it must be the highest level of Dao. If we can compare Xun Zi’s 
“xu, yi and jing” to Aristotle’s “θεωρια”, we could say that “θεωρια” is also the 
theoretical reflection of virtuous activities and external goods, so it must be the 
highest level of eudaimonia. Thus, if we only say on the highest level, Aristotle’s 
eudaimonia is contemplation, which is also the intellectualism argued for. 
On the other hand, if we say it on a lower level, Xun Zi’s Dao is virtuous 
activities and external goods and Aristotle’s happiness is the combination of virtuous 
activities and external goods, which is not the highest level of happiness and could 
not render the essence of happiness. 
That is to say, if we treat the virtuous activities and external goods as happiness, 
this is not wrong and we could render it as “practical happiness”. But we should also 
notice that, if we call contemplation as happiness, this is also not wrong, because 
contemplation includes the features of the perfect virtuous activities and is self- 
sufficient. In this case, we could render it as “theoretical happiness”. In fact, only the 
virtuous activities are promoted to the theoretical level, it could become the highest 
happiness because the virtues are quite limited to the specific circumstance and 
situation, while contemplation is beyond all circumstances and situation so that it is 
the highest happiness. Thus, if we treat Aristotle’s happiness as a consistent system, 
we could not treat the two understandings of happiness so extremely. In fact, practical 
happiness and theoretical happiness should be combined together. As Richard Kraut 
pointed out, 
 
Aristotle thinks that the most eudaimon individual is someone who has fully developed 
and regularly exercises the various virtues of the soul, both intellectual and moral. Such a 
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person engages in philosophical activity (since this is the full flowering of his capacity to 
reason theoretically) and also in moral activities, which display his justice, generosity, 
temperance, etc. (Kraut 1979, 170) 
     
  The essence of Dao and eudaimonia lies in “xu, yi and jing”and “θεωρια”, while 
in the reality, it is always rendered as the virtuous activities and external ritual or 
political principles. Dao and eudaimonia not only exist in the divine contemplation, 
but also in the practical virtuous activities and political systems.   
As we can see, in the comparison between Xun Zi and Aristotle’s philosophy, we 
may employ both the pragmatic approach and constructive-engagement strategy. 
First, we could identify a jointly concerned philosophical problem in Xun Zi and 
Aristotle, that is, Dao and eudemonia, and “xu, yi and jing” and “θεωρια”. Under 
such assumption, we could employ the understandings of Dao to solve the problem in 
the understandings of eudemonia. In fact, a seemingly trivial problem in one 
philosophical tradition may be tracked to its metaphysical foundation and ethical 
explication. In this case, we will have to find the common metaphysical or ethical 
foundations among the objects of comparison, from which we might make the valid 
engaging comparison. As Mou Bo points out,  
 
Are there any fundamentally shared common bases which serve as norms on which the 
debating parties (need to) observe or agree on and which can serve as one criterion (if not 
the exclusive criterion) by which to make due evaluative judgment in this connection? 
Indeed, if otherwise…, it can be hardly really engaging: the debating parties then might 
either talk about different objects (instead of talking about the same object differently) 
and thus essentially pass by each other or have no basis on which to understand and 
evaluate each other in some substantial connections. (Mou 2019, 187) 
 
In this case, we might not neglect the philosophical theorization in the 
comparative philosophy. After finding the jointly concerned problem, we can find the 
practical solutions to the problem. In terms of the understanding of Xun Zi’s Dao, we 
could find that the way for attaining Dao is virtuous activities, which could be 
compared to the virtuous activities in Aristotle. In the next step, we find that the 
crucial phase in attaining Dao is “xu, yi and jing”, which is quite similar to the 
process of “θεωρια” in Aristotle. In this sense, we could understand the relationship 
among the virtuous activities, “θεωρια” and eudemonia by employing the 
understandings of Xun Zi’s virtuous activities, “xu, yi and jing” and Dao. Although 
there are quite a lot of historical and philosophical differences between Xun Zi’s and 
Aristotle’s philosophies, it is in the jointly concerned problem that Xun Zi’s 
philosophy could provide a solution for the disputation of inclusivism and 
intellectualism in understanding Aristotle. 
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